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DO

Unclassified
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGEWhm Data Entered)
The strategic seucrity environment I assuemed is a multi-polar world with threats and capabilities across the operational continuum. Fiscalconstrants will be a key factory in our future but we are in position to handle it if we are creative and take advantage of our current strengths. It is important to understand what our nation' leaders want our Army to do if we are to provide the right force for the future. My methodology will be to review the process that Col.
(Ret) Art Lykke describes as the ends, ways, and means needed to accomplish our mission. I will review our national security interests and objectives as established by the President, from this will flow a national military strategy to provide the concepts for accomplishing the mission. Next must come a doctrinally-based structure to meet the anticipated needs of the Airlant Operations of the future. I have offered three alternative that are changes from our current divsional structure: the first is the currently suggested TRADOC structure which is basically an unchanged division; the second includesa brigade and smaller divisional overhead; and, the third suggest elimination of the division headquarters completely. After comparing advantages and disadvantages of each I have condluded that a fine tuning of our current structure is all that is required and major alterations are unnecessary. This paper challenges whether the current division structure can remain as the base of maneuver considering the impacts force reductions and the revision of the current Airland Operations doctrine will have on our Army. The structure of our Table of Organization (TOE) army has been centered on the division since World War I. As we look towards the requirements to downsize our total force, as a result of the victory of Cold War I, we must not be comfortable with a business as usual approach. I intend to challenge this paradigm and will offer my thoughts regarding the size and makeup of our tactical structure of the future. The strategic security environment I assumed is a multi-polar world with threats and capabilities across the operational continuum. Fiscal constraints will be a key factor in our future but we are in a position to handle it if we are creative and take advantage of our current strengths. It is important to understand what our nation's leaders want our Army to do if we are to provide the right force for the future. My methodology will be to review the process that Col. (Ret) Art Lykke describes as the ends, ways, and means needed to accomplish our mission. I will review our national security interests and objectives as established by the President, from this will flow a national military strategy to provide the concepts for accomplishing the mission. Next must come a doctrinally-based structure to meet the anticipated needs of the Airland Operations of the future. I have offered three alternatives that are changes from our current divisional structure: the first is the currently suggested TRADOC structure which is basically an unchanged division; the second includes a brigade and smaller divisional overhead; and, the third suggests elimination of the division headquarters completely. After comparing advantages and disadvantages of each I have concluded that a fine tuning of our current structure is all that is required and major alterations are unnecessary.
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE(When Data
Entered
INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this paper is to examine the division's structure as we look to the Army of 1995 and beyond. I start with the premise that the division, as it has been since World War I, will remain as our base for maneuver. I also recognize that any changes made in a division may require changes to corps structure above it as well as the brigades within it. Thus as I develop my concept, I will offer a recommended corps support structure that might be associated with my division. In addition, any changes I make to the division would naturally affect its major subordinate maneuver elements, the brigades.
Here too, I will illustrate what these changes may look like.
The environment that shapes my proposals will contain three primary elements:
(1) the reduction of the defense budget and thus a need to reduce the size of our Army, (2) the changing national security strategy and national military strategy that supports it, and (3) the evolving concepts of Airland
Operations -Future (ALO-F) as the doctrine that will shape our operational planning and execution in the future.
After a brief review of the ups and downs of the budget and its impact on the size of our Army, I will review our national security interests as established by the President and the corresponding national military strategy as I see it.
Next will be a review of the Chief of Staff of the Army's (CSA) vision of our Army. I will discuss some of the current thinking on the doctrine of the future that should ultimately drive any redesigning we might undertake.
After presenting several options to accommodate these changes outlined above, I will propose a fine tuning of our division structure that should be able to meet the requirements for any future missions our Army might have to face.
LOOKING BACK TO REMEMBER
It should come as no surprise to any of us that our Army is about to undergo a major directed reduction. Changes in the assessment of the threat to our national interests as well as budgetary pressures will certainly result in a smaller defense budget and thus mandate a smaller force. This is, however, a change that we have seen after each successful war (be it "hot" or "cold"). 1995. 5 So after reviewing the stated national security strategy and national military objectives to support it, are we now free to design the third leg of our stool? That is, can we plan to have the "means" or "resources" that we will need to get the job done?
Unfortunately, we do not work in an unconstrained fiscal reality. Not only can we expect a reduction in dollars, but we must also live with the advice and direction we will receive from the 535 members/advisers in Congress, each of whom has an idea on how best to execute the strategy laid down by the NCA. This, of course, assumes they support that strategy to begin with. Let's assume for the sake of this paper that we at least have a consensus on the ends and ways so that we can expect that the guidance given on the resourcing side will be based on the same assumptions we must use. So if we are to be able to provide our nation an Army that is able to protect our national security interest we can not be forced into letting it decline into something that is only prepared to defend the East and West Coasts of the United States.
We must create a contingency Army that is flexible and capable of rapid, worldwide deployment. There seems to be support for this approach in Congress at least in a broad sense. of the Army of tomorrow--an Army shaped and prepared to meet the broad range of challenges that will confront our nation in the 1990s and beyond." '1 0 In this paper, the CSA lists three elements he sees as key to the successful design of our future Army. "The Army of the future will have to be versatile, deployable, and lethal. 11 1 I would like to look at each of these because it will be the litmus test which any proposals for restructuring must pass or for justifying current structure as we downsize and thus reorganize our Army.
Versatility is listed first because it is seen as the key to future successes for our Army. "Versatility will require the right proportion of Active and Reserve Components, the correct mix of forces (heavy, light, and special operations), adequate sustainment stocks, and, above all, high quality in all aspects of the force.
' " 1 2 As we have seen earlier, our national security interests require not only for us to be prepared to protect our way of life here in the United States but also those vital interests so directly linked to our economic survival. Our militaryobjectives to support this end stated we would be a force capable of 9
ensuring that the NCA has the capability to act to retain these interests if he chooses or is forced to do so. Consequently, the If versatility is essential to enabling our Army to meet all of its challenges, then the ability to rapidly deploy this tailored force, to meet the given contingency, is clearly the next most important element for any force structure of the future.
Again our own CSA has stated his vision on this point when he said, "The nature of the United States' interest around the world, and its coalition-based strategy, will require that U.S.
forces be globally deployable, often with little or no warning, from the United States or from forward bases." '14 He is even more specific in his vision of the capabilities of our future force when he states, "The U.S. will also have to maintain an unquestionable ability to conduct an opposed entry into combat in defense of vital interests anywhere. In many contingencies, a forced entry will only be possible, or will best be achieved, by air.,,15
Thus when we get to designing the force structure of our Army of the future, it must not only be able to deal with the full range of conflict from nation assistance to nuclear war, it must also be able to take its versatility and move by air or sea to wherever it might be needed.
But what about the threat? It will do us no good to be able to configure or tailor our force and to deploy it rapidly to the trouble spot if when it gets there, it is unable to defeat the enemy. After all, the bottom line of our national security strategy may be to deter war but if that fails, the only acceptable outcome after that is to win the conflict at whatever level it may take.
This brings us to the third element of our CSA's vision, "lethality is the assured capability to defeat an opponent, winning as quickly as possible while preserving our most valued asset--the lives of our soldiers." '16 The Army of the 1990s and beyond must be structured to incorporate whatever technologies our modernization programs will provide. We must be able to integrate "system of systems" to ensure our forces, though smaller in number, can substitute the multipliers that precision If the doctrinal concept, which advocates the focus of campaign planning on corps, divisions and brigades, is to be the foundation upon which we build our structure, then we need to ensure our force design and modernization effort keeps this in focus as we work out the reduction and shifting of forces as a result of budget reductions, and changes from a forward deployed to a contingency Army. Aside from the focus on the corps, the other major changes in ALO-F is the deemphasis of the Central European linear battlefield and the recognition that conflicts leading to wars in the future will be fought using a more nonlinear approach than in the past. Thus any future force structure changes should be designed to improve agility and the ability to fight with greater separation and over a more open battlefield.
If we are to accommodate this ability to disperse and quickly concentrate our forces, a key element to our structure may very well be how we configure our combat support and combat service support elements to ensure we can sustain our fight.
Currently, "the division is the lowest level at which combat, In the next chapter, I will examine this corps, division, brigade structure and offer three options we might consider to e absorb the coming force reductions and yet design a contingency army that can fight within the tenets of ALO-F and win.
THREE STRUCTURAL OPTIONS
The three options I will discuss are first and foremost conceptual starting points for a more detailed analysis by TRADOC and eventual structure decisions by the Chief of Staff of the Army. The breadth and scope of this one-man effort will in no way provide the answer on division restructuring but hopefully will at least provide some conceptual parameters to be further studied. In any case, I will make a plea up front for a commitment from our senior leadership to thoroughly test the recommended structural changes before they are implemented. I would suggest that a methodology discussed by General M. Thurman would be appropriate. How many artillery, aviation and other type units would be assigned to the corps would depend upon the corps' mission and the number and type of assigned divisions. In fact, no one corps in the Army will be the same. In the three options I propose, the corps will continue to be an organization tailored by the commander based upon the situation and his mission analysis as to his particular needs. It will continue to be the commander's responsibility to task organize these forces to support his divisions and brigades on either a linear or nonlinear battlefield. It will be equally important for the force designers to provide our forward deployed, contingency, and reinforcing corps commanders the right forces, probably a mix of active and reserve components, that they would need. Those needs will be based on projected scenarios, contingency plans, and regional orientations and assessments, taking into consideration the current and projected capabilities of potential threats against which we may need to employ military power.
Another key element to consider when redesigning our division is the Corps Support Command (COSCOM). As depicted in figure 2 , our COSCOM will use multi-functional support groups to back up our divisions. These groups can be made up by combining current service, transportation, medical, and maintenance units to save us additional force structure. They would provide area coverage and unit distribution at least to the division's forward support battalions and dependent on the situation even lower if required. I do not intend to get into a detailed discussion on logistics or sustainment techniques however as will be seen, they are key considerations in any new division structure, and would demand thorough evaluation prior to any final decisions by the CSA.
With this as background, the first option for the future division's structure is a conservative one. It is the front runner in most of the recent ALO-F studies. -Cavalry squadron provides responsive security and reconnaissance effort for the division commander. 
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-Downsizes the aviation brigade, moving most of its resources to corps, thus reducing responsiveness to the division, as well as degrading the division's ability to integrate aviation resources when they are made available from corps.
-Direct support relationship of CS and CSS units within brigades does not allow complete control of all task AP force elements in a brigade by commander. This would reduce efficiency during nonlinear operations.
-Lacks capability to sustain itself independent of corps CS and CSS yet retains redundant CS and CSS elements at brigade and division level, both of which are also present at corps.
-Size in both personnel and equipment reduces rapid deployability necessary in our contingency based military strategy of the future.
In summary, this division structure would provide some autonomy to its brigades in combined arms relationships but not very much CS and CSS independence due to the Direct Support relationship. While it has been made leaner, it is still dependent on the corps for long-term sustainability and remains difficult to deploy. Along with this reduced headquarters would be more autonomous brigades capable of independent action (see figure 4) .
Added to the brigade would be two elements: a signal section, capable of integrating with corps elements using the newly This option provides a lean, rapidly deployable division made up of robust, self-sustaining brigades that can respond to small contingencies such as Grenada; reinforce and plug into forward corps such as in Korea or expand into a larger conflict that would require the entire contingency corp to be deployed.
In most instances it will provide the concentration of force where and when it would be needed and be able to adapt to either linear or nonlinear conflicts.
The third option I would offer takes the next step in this progression when addressing the division structure -it eliminates it entirely. I found an approach to doing this written by LTC Charles W. Treese. He suggests that while it is true that some scenarios will require exclusively heavy or light forces, most will require a mix of both. His proposals call for separate combat brigades under the control of a corps headquarters. This would provide the NCA the flexibility to respond to a crisis as he sees fit as well as the corps commander to task organize his force to the battlefield situation. -Requires additions at corps to provide adequate synchronization of CS and CSS planning and execution.
-Additions required at brigade and corps may offset savings gained by elimination of division headquarters.
-Asking corps commander to be both an operational and tactical commander may be too much.
This option is certainly the most radical of the three and with the technical increases in C 3 1 capabilities it may be feasible on paper. What will require a thorough review is the stress placed on the leadership that this option requires. The gap between brigade commanders at the colonel level and corps commanders at the three star level is wide indeed.
This gap warrants careful review and thought before we venture too far with this concept.
CONCLUSION
I have concluded that our choices for future structure are going to be difficult and will require bold leaders who have the vision and fortitude to take risks in order to make a change.
After all, we've won two World Wars and one Cold War structured as we are, so why try to fix something that doesn't appear to be broken? My point, however, is that changes in the strategic security environment and refocus of our Army as a responsive contingency force will require more than changes on the margin to downsize our force.
For this reason I rejected the status quo of option one (figure 3). My principal concerns with this structure are threefold. First, I'm convinced that, while it is the largest in structure and thus may appear to be the most capable, it in fact lacks the capability to sustain itself in the nonlinear environment visioned in ALO-F concepts. Flexibility and deployability are going to be key elements for our contingency based army of the future. This is my second concern with this option. The size of this division will slow its deployment and require a large amount of sea and airlift to move. Finally, the reality of our future army's structure is not going to be settled by merely reducing it to twenty divisions. The divisions themselves must be reduced to keep our Army below the 535K ceiling we are facing, and option one will not provide any significant personnel savings. and sustainment linkage to corps, we free the brigades to fight and preclude the overburdening that might result if we choose to eliminate the division completely.
Finally, whatever the recommendation may be from TRADOC, that will result in force structure decisions by the CSA, we must 25 keep in mind that "our nation expects an Army that can go where it needs to go to do what must be done and in so doing, ensure so far as possible the safety and welfare of its soldiers. This can only be accomplished with an Army that is strategically, operationally and tactically mobile, lethal, and one that is trained and maintained to be in a warfighting posture all the time. ''3 2 I'm convinced that the concept that I have proposed will help us meet our congressionally-mandated reductions while still retaining an Army able to fight and win on the battlefields of the future.
